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THE METAMORPHOSIS OF MARKETS: COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKING
ALMARIN PHILLIPS *
1. The process of market change
Financial markets are changing. The crystal balls of all observers are hazy, but
recent remarks by Dee W. Hock, president of VISA U.S.A., Inc., suggest that in the
next decade or so the reformation will be radical. According to Mr. Hock, there is
"an accelerating evolution in the exchange of value". Plastic cards will "unlock a
value reservoir to which [buyers and sellers] have never had access". He forecasts
that "investment houses, insurance companies, mortgage companies and other
repositories of value will provide card access to the value reservoirs they hold ....
When cards ... reach their full potential, they will identify a [payor] from any-
where in the world in full possession of all his assets, whether credit, deposit, invest-
ment, or equity - a customer ready to exchange them for whatever you sell" [1].
This projected metamorphosis in financial markets is largely unrecognized. Most
commercial bankers, trust officers, mutual funds managers, investment bankers, and
their respective regulators pay scant attention to this scenario. Their experiences
and the laws, rules and procedures under which they operate do not portend such
fundamental change. This lack of cognizance is typical in markets experiencing
change. The English handloom weavers did not foresee the impact of the power-
loom on their economic and social conditions; ferry boat operators gave no con-
sideration to the effect of bridges on their operations; carriage manufacturers gener-
ally ignored the early automobiles; most farmers failed to anticipate the technologi-
cal, social and economic implications which were to be wrought by the replacement
of horses and mules with the tractor; for many years railroad executives saw trucks
as complementary to, not competitive with, rail services; steam locomotive manu-
facturers literally derided the possibility of an efficient diesel locomotive. More to
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the point, it took decades for bankers, bank regulators, engravers of bank notes -
and economists - to recognize that demand deposits are as much 'money' as are
bank notes.
In the process of market change, while some firms and individuals fare remark-
ably well, others realize gross failures. Those who do not adapt to a new technology
are replaced and disappear. Interestingly, efforts to prevent market incursions,
whether by private action or through appeals to legislators and regulators, have ulti-
mately failed to protect the status quo. There is an inevitability about market
change even if its form is not precisely predictable. One reason for this inevitability
is an apparently endless, if numerically small, swarm of potential innovators, some
few of whom mark the great successes and many of whom fail, perhaps to try again
[2].
Market change, then, comes from someone perceiving a new way of performing
an existing service, a new way of improving an existing service, a way of providing
a new service to replace an existing service, or some combination of these. Where
regulation is a factor, a feature of the innovative act is often the discovery of a
means to circumvent regulatory constraints. The change agent may be an existing
firm in the most affected market, a firm entering from another market, or a com-
pletely new entity.
Commercial banks, their trust departments, and investment bankers are on the
threshold of a metamorphosis that will drastically alter their roles and postures in
financial markets. Their markets have changed and will continue to change as old
firms find new products and new markets and as new firms enter. Old regulations
will change or be circumvented. New regulations will appear, some favoring new
market organizations and some seeking to preserve the old.
2. Market metamorphosis - old style
Changes in the structure and performance of financial markets and institutions
are hardly new. History is not about to repeat itself in the developing interfaces
between commercial and investment banking, but a brief account of some changes
of years ago - and of the consequent policy responses - is an instructive predicate
to the arguments that follow.
A. Early history of trust departments
Trust institutions arose in the United States in the early 19th century and were
at first largely independent of commercial banks. Banks began entering the trust
business in volume after the Civil War. Because the newly chartered national banks
were prohibited from trust activities and because state chartered banks were effec-
tively precluded from the issuance of bank notes, the remaining state banks looked
for new services. One - and really the most important one - was extension of
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checking deposit banking for businesses. Another was the provision of trust serv-
ices. State banks also had lower reserve requirements and chartering provisions
were less stringent. By the turn of the century, the state banks far outnumbered the
national banks, with the larger ones commonly operating trust divisions.
By 1897, the American Bankers Association organized what was to become its
Trust Division. National banks were finally given the right to engage in the trust
business through the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 [3], the constitutionality of
which was clarified in First Nat7 Bank v. Union Trust Co. [4]. Actually, a number
of aggressive national banks had long been providing trust services by means of
interlocks and agreements with state banks or independent trust companies [5].
This is a good illustration of the use of innovative contracting to circumvent laws
and regulations.
B. Pre-depression mixing of commercial and investment banking
With the growth of trust business, commercial banks gradually began to engage
in underwriting and brokerage in securities markets [6]. Commercial bank under-
writing was further stimulated by the rise in security market activities during World
War I and, especially, during the 1920s. As commercial banks entered investment
banking, trust companies and investment bankers increasingly accepted deposits
and made commercial loans, often without the encumbering regulations governing
commercial banks. The commercial banks also entered each other's markets. Where
permitted by state law, entry occurred by branching, either de novo or by merger
[7]. Open interest rate rivalry for both time and demand deposits developed in
the larger 'money market' cities. These market changes heralded intensified rivalry
in all markets because of both intraindustry and interindustry competitive forces
[8].
The new competition resulted in bank failures well prior to the Great Depres-
sion. Over 1,000 commercial banks ceased operations because of absorptions, sus-
pensions, or liquidations in every year from 1924 through 1929, although presum-
ably only a few of these failures were directly related to the trust and securities
aspects of their business. An unknown number of trust companies and investment
bankers - certainly a small number relative to the totals - also failed during the
1920s. With the Crash of 1929, failures became systemic. From 1930 to 1933,
nearly 12,000 commercial banks suspended operations [9], and many investment
bankers and securities dealers went bankrupt or, by popular accounts, accepted
their fates by leaping from office windows.
C. Legislative and regulatory responses
The 1931-33 assessment indicated two principal causes of instability in finan-
cial markets. One was the intensified competition caused by 'everyone trying to
get into everyone else's ball game'. The other was the concomitant development
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of practices that were deceptive, fraudulent and manipulative.
The Subcommittee on Stock Exchange Practices of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency (the Pecora Committee) found that banks had recommended
the purchase of securities in which they had direct or indirect interests without dis-
closure to customers of material facts, extended loans with inadequate or nonexis-
tent collateral to companies in which they had investment interests, made loans to
officers and favored customers for speculative purposes, and used 'inside' informa-
tion to take positions in securities inconsistent with the interests of and explicit
recommendations to customers. Investment bankerg on their part had knowingly
abetted the complex manipulations of Insull, Kreuger and other financiers, with
gross failures to disclose, and 'with numerous instances of incompetence and irre-
sponsibility [10].
These findings led to the 1930s legislation that established extensive new regula-
tion of the banking system. Understandably, the legislative and regulatory responses
were protective. Measures designed to reduce or eliminate interindustry and intra-
industry competition, to prevent the use of deceptive and fraudulent practices, and
to provide emergency support for weak or failing banks were effected. The Recon-
struction Finance Corporation Act (1932) [11] gave the War Finance Corporation
added powers to make emergency loans to banks; the Glass-Steagall Act (1932)
[12] permitted member banks of the Federal Reserve System to use government
obligations to meet reserve requirements and authorized emergency loans to mem-
bers; the Emergency Banking Relief Act [13] legalized (post hoc) the closings of
the Bank Holiday and further extended Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan
powers; the Thomas Amendment (1933) [14] authorized the Federal Reserve to
purchase $ 3 billion in government securities from the market.
The Banking Act of 1933 [15] gave the Comptroller more supervisory powers,
established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, gave national banks branch-
ing powers equivalent to those of state banks, prohibited payment of interest on
demand deposits, and created controls over interest payments on time and saving
deposits. The Act declared in section 16 that dealings of national banks in securi-
ties and stocks "shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock
without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account, of customers, and in
no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issues of
securities or stock . . ." [16].
In even more comprehensive language that affected investment bankers and all
commercial banks, both state and federally chartered, section 21 prohibited "any
organization" that is engaged "to any extent whatever in the business of receiving
deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook ...
[from also engaging] in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing,
at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stock, bonds, debentures,
notes, or other securities..." [17].
The subsequent Banking Act of 1935 [18] enlarged the supervisory powers of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, reorganized the Board of Governors of
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the Federal Reserve System, gave dejure status to the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee, extended interest rate regulation to all insured banks, tightened chartering
standards for national banks and, through insurance provisions, made the charter-
ing standards for all banks except non-insured, non-member state banks essentially
the same as those for national banks. Competition, whether among commercial
banks or between them and investment banks, was in large measure prohibited.
Investment banks and securities dealers, previously subject only to state 'Blue
Sky' laws, were brought under Federal regulation by the Securities Act of 1933
[19] and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [20]. The latter act established the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Registration of issues in excess of S 300,000
was required, 'full' disclosure was mandated, the exchanges, dealers and brokers, and
listed securities were required to be registered, and devices and practices such as
market pools, wash sales, price pegging, some forms of short selling and 'own-
account' trading by brokers were prohibited or regulated. Bank margin loans were
regulated by the Board of Governors. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 [21] extended SEC regulation to this area. Legislation of 1939 [22] and 1940
[23] made further regulatory extensions to associations of dealers, trustees of
security issues (including bank trust departments), and investment companies and
investment advisors.
This legislation, with its accompanying regulatory and supervisory apparatus,
remains today as the primary restraint on inter- and intraindustry competition
among commercial banks, investment banks and securities dealers.
3. Market metamorphosis - new style
New market opportunities for fimancial institutions appeared shortly after World
War II. These were the mixed result of post-war real economic growth, a heavy
demand for capital, actual and anticipated inflation, rising interest rates - some-
times with inverted yield curves - and new technologies that created the means to
circumvent the restrictive laws and regulations of the pre-war period.
A. Competition among commercial banks in the post-World War II period
Immediately after World War II, the commercial banks literally disdained the
retail business. They were in an extremely liquid position because of their large
portfolios of government obligations. Commerical loan demands could be met by
selling government holdings and substituting higher yielding commercial loans [24].
By the early 1950s, however, the banks had largely depleted their inventories of
governments. Continued growth and loan demands required that they seek new
sources of money, and they had to do this in the face of generally rising interest
rates and, indeed, the strong attraction of rising stock market prices. The banks,
that is, found that they had to compete for funds in the complex money market.
This development ushered out the period of market stability that had characterized
the prior twenty years [25].
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The more aggressive banks turned to branching, both de novo and by merger.
The number of branches rose from 4,665 in 1950 to 21,424 by 1970. The branches
were a means of bringing the banks to the retail customer, but they also meant that
individual banks were moving into the markets of others. The banks also began to
compete for savings and time deposits by increasing interest rates, by foregoing the
right to require notice of withdrawal and by offering various types of accounts with
differing yields.
At first the rate maxima set by the Federal Reserve were graduated upward to
accommodate the banks' needs for funds, but the growing rivalry among the banks
and, by the mid-1960s, between the banks and the thrift institutions caused exten-
sion of the rate regulations to the latter and, generally, the imposition of constrain-
ing rate limits. Thus, in the tradition of the 1930s, regulators sought to temper the
effects of competition by increasing regulation. Banks responded by attempts to
circumvent the regulations. They issued new types of liability instruments (e.g., cer-
tificates of deposit and subordinated debt), they participated in a growing commer-
cial paper market, and they borrowed Euro-dollar funds.
Efforts at retail continued. Consumer lending grew rapidly. Checking accounts
could not bear interest, but they could be provided with no service charges and in
packages that contained items such as free travellers checks, prizes for deposits, free
tax advice, etc. Recently, and very pertinent to this paper (see below, Part 4), easy
transfers from interest-bearing accounts to the transactions balances of checking
accounts were promoted. The growing competition between the thrift institutions
and the banks resulted in the introduction of NOW accounts [26] and to demands
by some thrifts to be permitted directly to offer checking accounts. 'Check-like'
accounts, designed to provide services prohibited by law and regulation, also
emerged. Interindustry competition was again apparent.
This pressure led commercial banks to look elsewhere for market opportunities.
Their activities as banks were stringently circumscribed, but beginning in about
1965, a loophole in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 [27] was extensively
used to get into other markets. One-bank holding companies were formed, with a
bank as one subsidiary and with other subsidiaries - either bought or formed anew
- engaged in lines such as consumer finance, mortgage banking, equipment leasing,
computer services, travel agencies and insurance. By the time the movement was
somewhat constrained by the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 [28], the number of one-bank holding companies had grown from 550 in
1965 to 1,352. The percentage of total deposits held by their bank subsidiaries
rose from five percent to thirty-five percent in just five years.
B. Intersecting markets of commercial banks, trust departments and investment
banks in the post-war period
The demand for funds by banks and their efforts to find new markets in which
to 'buy money' were occasioned by high and rising interest rates. The new market-
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ing approaches coincided with fundamental money market changes in 1960-62,
the 'crunches' of disintermediation and high rates in 1965-66 and 1969-70, and
the phenomenally high rates of 1973-74 and 1978-79. They also coincided with
increased efforts on the part of investment bankers and securities dealers to attract
funds to their markets. During most of the period up to 1975, the prices of equity
securities were rising and incentives to get savings to flow to that market rather
than into the fixed-value and low yielding bank liabilities were developing. The
trust departments of banks, as institutional investors, became aware of new market
opportunities. This marked the beginning of the direct competitive interface
between investment and commercial banking.
The first efforts of investment banks to tap new business in the post-World
War II economic environment were in the area of mutual funds. The concept of
pooling the savings of many individuals into a common fund is an ancient one, but
the institutionalization and active marketing of the pooling through mutual funds
are relatively new. In 1940, mutual funds held less than half a billion dollars of the
nearly $ 80 billion of stock outstanding - about one-half of one percent. By 1968,
the funds held about S 51 billion in equity issues, representing roughly eight
percent of the total amount outstanding. There was rapid growth in holding by
other institutional investors as well, particularly in pension funds (largely managed
and held by bank trust departments) and in funds of life insurance companies. The
years of the 'institutional investor' had arrived [29].
As mutual funds and other institutional investors became more important in
stock exchange trading, intraindustry competition developed in these markets also.
Unlike the banking industry, where interest rates on deposits and other practices
are ostensibly regulated by public agencies, stock trading rules were set by the New
York Stock Exchange. To circumvent the rules, particularly the schedule of mini-
mum commission rates and requirements for trades by member firms to be trans-
acted on the floor, the institutional investors made new markets and, where this
was impossible, negotiated elaborate schemes for 'give-ups', which are commission
remissions and rebates [30]. Rules, whether public or private, can often be circum-
vented when markets offer opportunities. The 'new markets' comprised an exten-
sion of the Over-the-Counter market into a 'third market' of direct transactions and
increased use of regional exchanges. The third market generated a trading volume
adequate to induce the formation of a computerized quotation system, NASDAQ.
With rights of non-members to trade with members by wire connections and off-
the-floor established under the antitrust laws [31], the SEC finally abolished fixed
commission schedules on May Day, 1975. By that time the new markets had so
displaced the old that the number of member firms and offices had declined drasti-
cally through mergers and failures.
C. Commercial banks increase their investment banking functions
There were less obvious happenings going on in the background. The high per-
formance of the stock market and mutual funds through the 1950s made the pro-
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hibition against "issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing" any securities pain-
fully binding for commercial banks which, by the late 1950s, were looking for new
ways to attract funds. The provision that they could purchase and sell securities
"upon the order, and for the account, of customers", seemed to offer a possible
loophole. Nonetheless, the Federal Reserve Board, with powers to regulate trust
activities deriving from the 1913 and 1918 legislation, had not, in its Regulation
F [321, authorized investment agency or commingled accounts.
The opportunity for bank pressure for regulatory and legislative changes came in
1961 when President Kennedy appointed James J. Saxon to be Comptroller of the
Currency. Consistent with his general views that there was "an urgent need for a
thorough re-examination of existing policies and practices" of bank regulation,
Saxon undertook a campaign to change bank trust powers [33].
Large trust department banks wanted Regulation F changed so that certain
investments beneficial to their commercial departments would not be regarded as
conflicts of interest. They proposed a complete re-examination of Regulation F
with an eye to the relaxation of the limits for participations in common trust funds,
the admission of investment agency accounts, the use of advertising for common
trust funds, and increases in the transferability of participations to other trusts
without capital gains taxation. It was recommended that the trust powers of
national banks be regulated by the Comptroller instead of the Federal Reserve, so
that the banks could "keep pace with the changing needs of the public for such serv-
ices" [341.
In the Act of September 28, 1962, Congress transferred the regulation of the
fiduciary capacities of national banks to the Comptroller [35]. In April, 1963, the
Comptroller issued a new Regulation 9 [36] with the express purpose of giving
"banks greater operating discretion and greater freedom to compete in additional
trust-related areas" [37]. Regulation 9 reflected the new market environment.
Rather than being a detailed and confining set of rules, it was "a general pronounce-
ment" [38]. Some additional regulations and reporting requirements were imposed,
but the limits on participations were liberalized [39] and the collective investment
of managing agency funds was authorized [40]. These developments provided the
green light for market metamorphosis withincreased interindustry competition, and
also the green light for litigation.
First National City Bank (now Citicorp), an organization with a history of inno-
vating new ways to attract funds, took advantage of the new freedom. With the
approval of the three Federal Bank regulatory agencies, it applied in 1965 to the
SEC for exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940 so that it might
organize and manage commingled funds with participations issued and distributed
to the general public by the bank [41]. The SEC approved the exemptions, despite
opposition from the Investment Company Institute, the National Association of
Security Dealers, the Association of Mutual Fund Sponsors, the Investment Bankers
Association of America, and the Association of Stock Exchange Firms. First
National City began operations and the investment banking community brought
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suit against the Comptroller in 1967. In 1971, the Supreme Court held that bank
sponsorship and distribution of open-ended commingled funds violated the Glass-
Steagall Act [42]. According to the Court, the rules of the 1930s were meant to
apply to the markets of the 1960s and 1970s.
Recognizing that its actions in directly selling shares in commingled funds might
be declared illegal, First National City organized a Special Investment Advisory
Service (SIAS) in 1967, with purchases and sales of securities to be made through
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith under a power of attorney signed by the
participant [43]. This was contested by the SEC as a violation of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Act of 1933 and the plan was abandoned
[44].
Given this posture of law and regulation, a few trust departments tried to find
other more acceptable ways into fund operations which would not involve the
direct underwriting, sale and distribution of securities. By law, trust departments
were restricted to the roles of acting for the account of customers, and as agent,
advisor, custodian or fiduciary, while underwriting, selling and distributing could be
done only by investment banks and security dealers. The answer, then, was for the
trust departments to develop contractual arrangements with investment banks that
would violate neither the securities laws and regulations, nor the Comptroller's
Regulation 9 and yet would permit commingled funds. While many investment
bankers retained allegiance to the intent and spirit of the Glass-Steagall Act, a few
strayed from the fold and joined with the banks [45]. As advisors, custodians, and
transfer agents, the trust departments of banks found a way into the mutual fund
business in the same manner as the national banks developed trust services despite
regulatory prohibitions prior to 1913.
D. Trust departments and investment banks enter commercial bank markets
As the involvement of trust departments in mutual fund activities marked a
step by commercial banks into investment banking, investment bankers moved in
the opposite direction. Short-term interest rates rose dramatically after 1972. The
prime rate averaged 4.66% in 1972 and 8.20% in 1973. By July, 1974, the prime
was at 12%. The federal funds rate was at times much higher. Rates on Treasury
bills and bankers acceptances behaved similarly [46]. These rates were well above
the yields on stocks, however computed, and resulted in a depression of stock
prices. The high rates accentuated the need for corporate cash management and, in
particular, made any balances held in zero-yielding demand deposits extremely
costly.
This situation provided the ingredients for another market innovation - the
'cash-managing' or 'money-market' fund. A few investment firms and a few banks
operating through investment firms started these funds, specializing in portfolios of
debt comprised of Government bonds, Treasury bills, commercial paper, bankers
acceptances and certificates of deposit. The Reserve Fund, begun in 1972, was the
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first of these, but by mid-1976 at least fifty funds were in operation [47]. In June,
1974, the Reserve Fund was yielding 11.42%, with other funds not far behind [48].
Firms and individuals thus had a place to put money at market yields, gaining the
advantages of fund diversification while retaining liquidity, and the sellers of obliga-
tions - borrowers who had traditionally used commercial bank loans -had a new
source of funds.
Money market funds provide for wire order redemptions and transfers; most
offer redemption and transfer by 'check'; transfer by card may soon be possible.
The minimum amount necessary to open an account varies from $ 1,000 to
$ 100,000, but the smaller figure is typical. Service charges for checks are levied
and minimum check sizes - usually $ 250 or $ 500 - are set. At least eight of the
funds restrict sales to institutions, but the others are available to individuals. From
the p6int of view of the user, these funds look like interest-bearing checking and
transactions accounts. They are subject to a few restrictions on use, and there are
service charges, but since they can be used to write drafts for payments to the order
of others, the funds have the salient characteristics of 'money' [49].
Even more 'check-like' than the money market fund is the Merrill Lynch 'Cash
Management Account' (CMA) introduced in July, 1977. Investment banking firms
have traditionally invested margin account funds and paid interest to the owners of
those accounts, with dividends and interest earned on customers' other investments
also being credited to the margin accounts. Under a plan developed in cooperation
with City National Bank of Columbus, Ohio, itself a leader in electronic funds
transfer innovations, the collective margin accounts became a money fund, with
checking privileges and with access through a VISA debit card. The card permits
ordinary card usage for purchases, plus the usual cash advances. Overdraft protec-
tion is afforded by any excess balance in the margin account and by margin loans
before the advances on the card are used. There is privately arranged insurance of
up to $ 300,000 per account [50].
The CMA plan is still in the experimental stages but, if it is successful, an invest-
ment banking firm, with the cooperative facilities of a commercial bank, will indeed
have entered the most distinctive service of commercial banking [51]. This is the
most interesting indication that Mr. Hock's forecast that cards will provide access
to value reservoirs throughout the financial markets will indeed become a reality.
Demand deposits of commercial banks, earning no interest, will be replaced by
other institutional liabilities if present regulations persist.
4. The future: markets and public policy
A. The electronic funds transfer system
Over the past decade, there has been a great deal of discussion about an elec-
tronic funds transfer system (EFTS). Beyond the discussion, there has been enough
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implementation to see how the emerging EFTS is likely to function. Some financial
institutions - probably large commercial banks - will have host computer opera-
tions connected with terminals at retail outlets, other types of non-financial
businesses, households, and their own automated teller and other terminal facilities.
There will be terminals and smaller computer capabilities at other banks and thrift
institutions connected to the host computer, providing operationally distributed
processing for many types of transactions. These will connect with their respective
retail, household and business customers. Card companies, securities dealers, insur-
ance companies, and other institutions holding 'inventories of values' denominated
in dollars will also connect directly or indirectly through other financial institu-
tions to host computers and automated clearing facilities. Dollar conversions to and
from foreign currencies will, through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Finan-
cial Telecommunications or successor organizations, become reality. In truth, as
Mr. Hock foresees, many new types of assets will be convertible to payments orders
depending only on contract terms and transactions costs.
With EFT, the financial system will increasingly operate as an integrated whole.
Transfers will occur within a single institution (e.g., from a savings to a demand
deposit), between institutions of the same class (e.g., from a demand deposit in one
bank to a demand deposit in another), between deposit institutions of different
classes (e.g., from a thrift institution to a commercial bank), between deposit and
non-deposit financial institutions (e.g., from a commercial bank to a security
dealer), between non-deposit financial institutions (e.g., from one security dealer to
another), between any of the financial institutions and the non-financial sector
(e.g., from a security dealer to a furniture store, as in the Merrill Lynch plan) or
among various foreign currencies.
B. Regulation of investment and commercial banking in an EFT environment
With EFT technology, it will be impossible to prevent commercial banks and
their trust divisions from engaging in securities transactions. Funds will flow from
market to market. It will be impossible to prevent investment bankers and security
dealers from effecting funds transfers, just as it is currently impossible to prevent
the thrift institutions from engaging in funds transfers. The intentions of the 1930s
legislation will be thwarted as every 'comer of the market' is laid open to competi-
tive attack.
Legislation could, of course, be designed with the intention of preventing or
delaying this mixing of markets. This was the response of the 1930s. The techno-
logical environment is very different now, however. In 1935, one could order the
sale of a security, receive a check, deposit the check in a bank, and write a draft for
the purchase of goods. It was a costly and time consuming process, but the value of
the securities was used by the individual to purchase the goods. The difference in
the current state of technology is that EFT makes the set of transactions needed to
sell a security in order to buy goods virtually instantaneous and entails very small
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transactions costs. Legislative impediments would only make the EFT network
loops more complex. They would be similar in effect to cutting all direct telephone
lines between New York and Chicago: calls would just be rerouted, with the caller
not recognizing that his voice travelled by way of San Francisco. The technology is
here, just as were the technologies of the powerloom, the automobile, the tractor,
the truck, the diesel locomotive and the demand deposit.
As technology evolves, it is becoming increasingly clear that the laws and regula-
tions of the 1930s are in fact accelerating the mixing of markets rather than retard-
ing it. Further, rather than protecting commercial banks, the legislation is contrib-
uting to their difficulties. In the absence of regulatory reform, the public will
suffer along with the banks.
The now ancient prohibition of interest on demand deposits, in an environment
of high interest rates, forces bank customers and other financial institutions to look
to alternative liabilities for the holding of transactions balances. This prohibition,
combined with new technology, is the primary reason for the increase in the turn-
over velocity of demand deposits in recent years. Bank customers hold minimum
balances in demand deposits, using them only when other less costly transactions
media are not available.
Regulation of interest in savings and time deposits similarly induces alternative
asset holdings. Funds move to higher interest rate options, many of which now
afford transaction services as well as higher yields. New fund institutions are buying
funds from and selling funds to commercial bank customers at the same time. In
this light, bank trust departments, with money market funds accessible by check or
by card, are clearly in competition with their own and other commercial depart-
ments. They complement the trust activities of smaller banks by providing high
yielding, liquid investments. They provide a substitute for currency and demand
deposits, paying current market rates on what are essentially transactions balances.
Preservation of the commercial banking function requires not restrictive legis-
lation, but rather legislation freeing the commercial banks so that they can compete
in buying and selling funds. Absent such liberalization, EFT is likely to transform
commercial departments into mere transactors of funds transfers - the 'switch-
boards" in the EFTS - with greatly reduced direct involvement of their own assets
and liabilities in the funds intermediation process. The more restrictive the regula-
tions, the faster will the transition occur. As of this writing, high rates are spurring
new ventures by non-commercial bank institutions, including trust departments,
into funds transfers [52].
Unhappily, unlike Mr. Hock, and reminiscent of the handloom weavers, the ferry
boat operators, the carriage manufacturers, the railroads, the steam locomotive
manufacturers and the issuers of bank notes, commercial bankers and their regula-
tors generally either fail to see what the future holds or are content to adhere to
short-term solutions. A few are attempting to adapt to the new world despite the
old regulations; some are succeeding [53].
The change, it should be recognized, is going to be radical enough to cause a
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major restructuring of commercial banking and other deposit institution markets. If
regulations are relaxed, some banks and other deposit institutions will be unwilling
or unable to adapt to the market forces. If regulations are not relaxed, other insti-
tutions will take their place. This is a dilemma most institutions choose to ignore.
On balance, a policy of gradually removing the constraints of the 1930s with the
types of reform suggested by the Commission on Money and Credit [54], the Heller
Committee [55], the Hunt Commission [56], the proposed Financial Institutions
Act [57] and the Financial Reform Act [58], and by the National Commission on
Electronic Fund Transfers [59], is the best policy route to follow. Still, one should
be sanguine neither about the probability of orderly adoption nor about their effec-
tiveness in maintaining present market structures even if passed.
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